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THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN NORTH DAKOTA 
DAVID SCHULTZ  
 
ABSTRACT 
This article provides a brief assessment of the state of democracy in 
North Dakota, using it as a case study to make some broader claims about 
politics in America.  The overall thesis is that while North Dakota has some 
attributes that lend itself to promoting its image as populist, the reality is 
that democracy is far from secure in the Peace Garden State.  Instead, the 
largely unregulated, free-for-all political environment has yielded a state 
where its outputs have produced a political process that is often corrupt, or 
at least malfunctions, in serious ways.  Thus, North Dakota is emblematic 
of some larger trends in American politics.  In order to make this claim, this 
article will do several things. 
First, the article will offer a brief introduction to the political history 
and structure of North Dakota politics.  The goal will then eventually be to 
focus on two major facets of North Dakota politics—its use of initiative and 
referendum and its failure to regulate the use of money in politics.  Second, 
both of these features of North Dakota politics will be examined to reveal 
how they have damaged the state’s political system and how such damage 
is a microcosm of broader problems with ballot initiatives and unregulated 
money in politics. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
North Dakota is a political enigma.  It is home to direct democracy 
through initiative and referendum, but it is also a state ranked with a failing 
grade in political accountability and integrity.1  It has used ballot initiatives 
to further many government reforms, but it has a record of targeting 
individual rights.  It is a state with unique “socialist” institutions, such as 
the nation’s only state-owned bank2 and mill,3 yet it is also a state gripped 
with free market frontier frenzy on the Bakken reserve when it comes to 
regulating the hydraulic fracturing technology and practices implemented to 
 
1. See State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/8423/grading-nation-how-accountable-your-state. 
2. In 1919, the North Dakota state legislature established the Bank of North Dakota (the 
“Bank”) to establish state ownership of the various marketing and credit agencies, and to protect 
local farmers from the predatory lenders and financing.  The Bank was created in an effort to 
promote agriculture, commerce and industry throughout the state and is, now, an institution 
claiming more than $270 million in capital.  Moreover, the Bank became the first financial 
institution to issue federally insured student loans in 1967.  See Bank of N.D., BANK OF NORTH 
DAKOTA, available at http://banknd nd.gov/about_BND/history_of_BND html (last visited Apr. 
21, 2014).  
3. The North Dakota Mill and Elevator Association began operating October 22, 1922 as a 
value-added market for wheat produced in North Dakota, which now adds value to twenty three 
million bushels of North Dakota spring and durum wheat annually by selling wheat products to 
various bakery, pasta customers, and food service suppliers—providing the state with an annual 
payroll of s$7 million.  History, NORTH DAKOTA MILL, available at 
https://www ndmill.com/history.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). 
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extract oil and natural gas from one of the nation’s largest oil basins.4  It is 
the only state in the country that does not require citizens to register to vote, 
yielding one of the highest voter turnout rates in the country, but it also 
largely does not regulate political spending.  Consequentially, it is hard to 
label North Dakota as either a sterling example of democracy or a 
representation of what ails much of contemporary American democracy. 
Two events best capture the enigma of North Dakota politics.  First is 
the legislative resolution in 2013 that will send to the voters a constitutional 
amendment defining personhood, effectively aimed at ending abortion and 
reproductive rights of women.  Should it be adopted, it will, on one hand, 
represent democracy in action—the people acting on their own to legislate.  
However, should it pass, it will also represent the use of majority rule to 
infringe upon individual rights.  Conversely, the right of individuals and 
most entities to make unlimited political contributions is either expression 
of a real marketplace of political ideas or it is a sign of the power of money 
to corrupt politics. 
This article provides a brief assessment of the state of democracy in 
North Dakota, using it as a case study to make some broader claims about 
politics in America.  The overall thesis is that while North Dakota has some 
attributes that lend itself to promoting its image as populist, the reality is 
that democracy is far from secure in the Peace Garden State.  Instead, the 
largely unregulated, free-for-all political environment has yielded a state 
where its outputs have produced a political process that is often corrupt, or 
at least malfunctions, in serious ways.  Thus, North Dakota is emblematic 
of some larger trends in American politics.  In order to make this claim, this 
article will do several things. 
First, the article will offer a brief introduction to the political history 
and structure of North Dakota politics.  The goal will then eventually be to 
focus on two major facets of North Dakota politics—its use of initiative and 
referendum and its failure to regulate the use of money in politics.  Second, 
both of these features of North Dakota politics will be examined to reveal 
how they have damaged the state’s political system and how such damage 
is a microcosm of broader problems with ballot initiatives and unregulated 
money in politics. 
 
4. According to various studies, it is estimated that the Bakken formation could contain as 
much as 503 billion barrels of original oil in place (“OOP”)—placing the Bakken formation as one 
of the largest oil basins in the world.  See Leonardo Maugeri, Oil:  The Next Revolution, BELFER 
CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, June 2012, at 47. 
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA POLITICS AND 
POLITICAL REGULATION 
David B. Danborn describes North Dakota as a state full of aspirations 
that were never realized.5  Instead the state has constantly been gripped by a 
sense of inferiority or a colonial status: “dominated economically, socially, 
culturally, and politically by outsiders.”6  It is also a state often seen as an 
outsider, isolated by weather and geography from the rest of the Midwest.7  
The importance of this description is that this sense of isolation and being 
an outsider has meant that the people of North Dakota generally pull 
together and are “tolerant and sensitive to one another;” they remain 
contemptuous of outsiders, including that of its own Native-American 
population.8  But this sense of community born of its isolation has 
politically meant that North Dakota often looks nonpartisan and non-
ideological,9 especially after the early experiences of farmer populism, 
progressivism, and perhaps, socialism and the Non-Partisan League were 
extinguished from the state, leaving it to this day with a culture largely 
conservative.10  North Dakota politics also are characterized by its sense of 
community tied to family and church, and by a commitment to “civil pride 
and sense of civic responsibility.”11  As a result, one can describe 
contemporary North Dakota politics as both a mixture of libertarianism and 
communitarianism, strongly conservative, but with vestiges of populism 
that still reside within the state. 
North Dakota’s political history and culture have produced a unique 
regulatory framework when it comes to its government and campaigns and 
elections.  In many ways the regulatory framework is libertarian, displaying 
little effort to control or regulate campaigns and elections or the political 
process in general.  For example, North Dakota is the only state in the 
country that does not require its citizens to register to vote;12 they merely 
 
5. David B. Danborn, North Dakota: The Most Midwestern State, in HEARTLAND: 
COMPARATIVE HISTORIES OF MIDWESTERN STATES 107 (James H. Madison ed., 1990). 
6. Id. at 109. 
7. Id. at 110, 118.  See also Thomas W. Howard, Preface, to THOMAS W. HOWARD, THE 
NORTH DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION, vii, viii (1981), for a similar description. 
8. Danborn, supra note 5, at 111. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 113-14.  See also Larry Remele, Power to the People:  The Nonpartisan League, in 
THE NORTH DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION 66 (Thomas W. Howard ed., 1981) for a discussion 
of the Nonpartisan League and the early radicalism of North Dakota politics including during the 
Progressive Era; D. Jerome Tweton,  The Anti-League Movement:  The IVA, in THE NORTH 
DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION 93 (Thomas W. Howard ed.,1981) documents the conservative 
legacy remaining after the purging in the 1920s and 1930s the Nonpartisan League from the state. 
11. Danborn, supra note 5, at 122-23. 
12. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04 (2009).  
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need to be residents of the state, with the rules of residency prescribed by 
law that make it difficult to lose voter eligibility.13  In 2012, this yielded a 
voter turnout of 60.5% in the presidential election;14 a respectable turnout 
above the national state average of 58.2% but below the national leader 
Minnesota with a 75.7% turnout.15  As of August 1, 2013, North Dakota 
now requires voters to present identification before casting a ballot, unless 
the poll worker can vouch for the voter’s identity and address.16  How such 
a law will eventually affect the voter turnout in the state is yet to be seen, 
but it does demonstrate that North Dakota politics is engrossed by fears of 
voter fraud that are seen across the country.17 
Second, North Dakota largely does very little to regulate political 
expenditures and contributions.  In 1981, North Dakota adopted a new 
election code modeled, in many ways, on federal law.  But that law, for the 
most part, was not debated or even challenged in court, leaving it with a 
parse history regarding what its key provisions meant.18  Limits on political 
expenditures are largely unconstitutional, so it is not a surprise that they are 
permitted in North Dakota.  In fact, North Dakota, like many states, bans 
direct corporate contributions to candidates.19  But long before Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, corporate contributions were 
permitted in North Dakota so long as they were done through a separate 
segregated fund under control of the corporation.20  There is no public 
financing for any elections in North Dakota.  In addition, there are no 
contribution limits of any kind in the state, at least since the 1995 revisions 
of the North Dakota Century Code (“Century Code”).  Moreover, the 
Century Code contains no statutory provisions with respect to the 
organization and formation of a PAC.  In effect, except for direct corporate 
contributions to candidates, almost anyone or any entity can make unlimited 
political contributions to any state candidates in North Dakota.  In light of 
Citizens United, it is also questionable regarding whether any restrictions on 
 
13. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-26 (2008).  In effect, this statute requires one to 
intentionally renounce residency, and it is not lost automatically as a result of marriage or as stated 
in N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-01-04, by relocation or attendance at school. 
14. Michael McDonald, 2012 General Election Turnout Rates, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2012G html (last visited May 30, 2014). 
15. Id. 
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-07 (2009). 
17. See generally LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD (2010). 
18. Bruce A. Schoenwald, A Conundrum in a Quagmire: Unraveling North Dakota’s 
Campaign Finance Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1) (2013). 
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2).  See also Schoenwald, supra note 18, at 1, 4. 
           
376 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:371 
expenditures from corporate treasuries—and the requirement that they come 
from separate segregated funds—are constitutional.21 
The largely laissez-faire regulatory environment towards politics 
extends to disclosure and regulation of lobbying and lobbyists.  In terms of 
political contributions, there is no requirement to disclose unless the 
contributions exceed $200 in the aggregate during a reporting period.22  For 
lobbyists, the state largely does not regulate them or provide the public with 
much information regarding their activity.23  The laws regarding lobbying 
were adopted in 1975 and have not been changed much since then, despite 
the growth of the number of lobbyists in the state,24 and the trend 
nationwide toward more lobbyist restrictions.25  In North Dakota, the laws 
regarding when lobbyists are required to register, or the restrictions on them 
giving gifts to legislators, are also lax.26  In fact, lobbyists only need to 
disclose expenditures of sixty dollars or more per legislator,27 amounts 
higher than neighboring Minnesota.28  Additionally, if a lobbyist offers a 
gift to a legislator, he needs to give her the opportunity to purchase it.29  
This is hardly much of a restriction, especially compared to the restrictions 
many other states place on such behavior.30  When it comes to prosecution 
or enforcement of election law violations, North Dakota’s laws are largely 
ineffective.31  This is true for several reasons.  First, the laws are enforced 
by partisan officials who are subject to political pressures and influences—
especially with respect to prosecuting these election law violations.32  
Second, because there are no provisions for advisory opinions, parties are 
left often times in the dark regarding what the law requires.33  Third, North 
 
21. Nathan R. Martindale, Comment, Citizens Divided:  Balancing the First Amendment 
Right to Free Speech and the Role of Private Corporations in Our Nation’s Elections, 86 N.D. L. 
REV. 619, 632 (2010). 
22. This period is usually calendar year.  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03 (2013). 
23. Levi D. Andrist & Joel Gilbertson, Lawyering and Lobbying: the Discipline of Public 
Policy Advocacy, 87 N.D. L. REV. 59, 61 (2011). 
24. Id. at 62. 
25. See generally Jessica A. Levinson, Timing Is Everything: A New Model for Countering 
Corruption Without Silencing Speech in Elections, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 853 (2011).  
26. Andrist & Gilbertson, supra note 23, at 63-64. 
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-03(2) (2013).  
28. Andrist & Gilbertson, supra note 23, at 69-70.  
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-05(1)(2) (2013).  
30. See Ethics:  Legislator Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx (last visited on 
Dec. 3, 2013).  
31. See generally Allen Dickerson & Zac Morgan, Campaign Finance Advisory Opinions at 
the State Level, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2012). 
32. Id. at 785. 
33. Id. at 784. 
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Dakota does little to audit campaign finance reports.34  As a result, few 
enforcement actions for violations are ever brought.35 
What is the result of this largely unregulated environment?  While 
North Dakota may come out on top in some surveys for financial 
management,36 it certainly ranks low when it comes to political 
management.  For example, North Dakota has one of the highest per capita 
state conviction rates for corruption.37  Additionally, a survey jointly 
undertaken by Center of Public Integrity and several other groups awarded 
North Dakota an “F” on its Corruption Risk Report Card, placing it forty-
third in the nation.38  The State received failing grades for political 
financing, legislative accountability, lobbyist disclosure, and ethics 
enforcement.39 
North Dakota politics are largely driven by consensus—at least 
consensus among business and political elites operating in close proximity 
to one another.  For example, the Consensus Council is “a private, nonprofit 
corporation which was founded in 1990 by a partnership of North Dakota’s 
private and public leaders.”40  While noble in theory, such a council gives 
business leaders unique access to policy makers, allowing them 
opportunities for special influence and the ability to help define and set the 
legislative agenda.  In addition, the Center for Responsive Politics notes 
how several industries in North Dakota, such as agriculture and energy, are 
major political contributors in the state.41  While this data is for federal 
elections, the presumption is that state elections are equally dominated by 
industry money.  However, no study on the relationship between money and 
politics has been done in North Dakota, partially because the lax disclosure 
laws would make such a study difficult.  One is thus left with conjecture on 
this topic. 
 
34. Todd Lochner, Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 4 ELECTION L.J. 329, 338 (2005). 
35. Id. at 345. 
36. The Best and Worst Run States In America: A Survey of All Fifty, 24/7 WALL ST,  
http://247wallst.com/investing/2010/10/04/the-best-and-worst-run-states-in-america-a-survey-of-
all-fifty/ (last visited on Nov. 17, 2013).  
37. See generally Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of 
Super Pacs, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755 (2012) (noting how North Dakota ranks in the top ten of states 
for convicted officials per capita). 
38. State Integrity, N.D. Corruption Risk Report Card, 
http://www.stateintegrity.org/north_dakota (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
39. Id. 
40. Bruce T. Levi & Larry Spears, Public Policy Consensus Building: Connecting to Change 
for Capturing the Future, 70 N.D. L. REV. 311, 315 (1994). 
41. North Dakota Leading Industries,  CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/states/indus.php?cycle=2012&state=ND (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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Finally, the largely hands off regulatory environment is joined by the 
state’s use of initiative and referendum.  North Dakota adopted initiative 
and referendum in 1914.42  According to the Secretary of State, from 1889 
until 2010 there have been a total of 486 measures placed on the ballot for 
voters to consider.  These include matters referred to the people by the 
legislature or Constitutional Convention (233).  There have also been 45 
citizen-initiated constitutional measures and 134 statutory measures.43  
From 1918, when the first instances of initiative or referendum were placed 
before voters, through 1998, there were a total of 166 ballot propositions, of 
which forty-five percent have passed.44 
However, while the use of initiative and referendum has perhaps 
produced some good results, it has also been used to target individual 
rights.  A 1972 pro-choice law allowing for physicians to terminate some 
pregnancies failed.  In 2004, an anti-gay marriage constitutional initiative 
was adopted by voters.  In 2000, a constitutional initiative was adopted by 
voters declaring “[h]unting, trapping, and fishing and the taking of game 
and fish are a valued part of our heritage and will be preserved for the 
people and managed by law and regulation for the public good.”45  This 
type of legislation, also adopted in states such as Minnesota, is less about 
the right to hunt and fish and were often adopted in reaction to Native-
American Indian treaty rights.46  In November, 2014, there will be a 
“personhood” amendment on the ballot declaring “[t]he inalienable right to 
life of every human being at any stage of development must be recognized 
and protected.”47  Personhood amendments generally are aimed at limiting 
abortion rights.48  The new state requirement mandating identification to 
vote49 also targets individual and perhaps minority rights.50  Thus, while in 
 
42. SEC’Y OF STATE, N.D. BLUEBOOK 504 (2011-2013). 
43. Id. at 508. 




visited on Dec. 2, 2013). 
45. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27. 
46. Mary Jane Morrison,  Amending the Minnesota Constitution in Context: The Two 
Proposals in 2012, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 137 (2013). 
47. Measures on the November 4, 2014 Ballot, N.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
https://vip.sos nd.gov/PortalListDetails.aspx?ptlhPKID=4&ptlPKID=1#content-start (last visited 
on Dec. 2, 2013). 
48. Mark Strasser, The Next Battleground? Personhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies,  65 OK L.REV. 177, 177-78 (2013). 
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-07 (2009). 
50. See generally David Schultz, Less than Fundamental:  The Myth of Voter Fraud and the 
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 484 (2008). 
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general less than half of all ballot measures pass in North Dakota, those 
targeting rights seem to have nearly a one hundred percent passage rate. 
This prairie populism and letting voters legislate with minimal 
regulation is yet another sign of the largely deregulatory approach to state 
politics.  In effect, along minimal regulation of the election and lobbying 
process, North Dakota places little regulation on the people directly on 
voting on legislation.  Thus, one can summarize the state of North Dakota 
democracy as essentially unregulated and wide open.  It is the land of 
limited regulation of money in politics, lobbying, disclosure, and the power 
of the people to self-legislate.  Is this democracy at its finest?  Not 
necessarily.  The wide-open use of ballot initiatives and the unregulated use 
of money in politics in North Dakota are emblematic of two of the worst 
features of American politics. 
III. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND BALLOT INITIATIVES 
North Dakota adopted initiative and referendum in 1914.  It did so 
during the Progressive Era of politics encompassing a period of American 
history from the end of Reconstruction to the end of World War I.51  The 
era was marked by several characteristics, including a significant growth of 
corporate influence and power as well as by the concentration of wealth in 
the United States.52  For some, this concentration of wealth lead to concerns 
among many that the ideals, and perhaps reality of American democracy, 
were in danger of being lost.53 
The threat to American democracy was especially manifested in how 
this concentration in wealth and power was a corrupting influence, affecting 
the purity and morality of its political institutions.54  Thus, the capacity of 
legislatures across the country to act and represent the people was 
threatened because of the plutocratic control and domination of them by big 
business.55  It was out of a fear that the entrenched power of special 
interests, such as business interests, had infected politics and resulted in the 
incapacity of legislatures to act to serve the majority that Progressive 
politics was born.56 
Progressive politics held government and big business in contempt, 
seeing them as teaming together to be the enemy of the people.57  
 
51. See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER:  1877-1920 (1967). 
52. Id. at 13. 
53. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:  FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 5-6 (1955). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 238. 
56. Id. at 257. 
57. Id.; see also WIEBE, supra note 51, at 5. 
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Progressives sought to restructure American political institutions58 and to 
wrestle power back to serve the people.59  The solution to doing this resided 
in initiative, referendum, and recall.60  William Munro of the National 
Municipal League, one of the prime supporters of these three reforms, 
described the Progressive animus behind these reforms as lying in public 
loss of hope in the ability of legislators to act: 
But a large section of the electorate has come to the conclusion 
that these channels do not afford adequate facilities for the 
assertion of popular sovereignty. [I]t can scarcely be urged that the 
old machinery of democracy is fulfilling its professed ends to the 
satisfaction of all. Popular distrust of the present system of law-
making is undeniably widespread and deep. But it is not based on 
the idea that the representatives of the people are incompetent to 
do their duty. Rather it arises from the notion that they are 
prevented from doing it. And these preventing influences, in the 
popular mind, are various organized interests–political machines 
and economic corporations–whose wishes do not usually run 
parallel those of the electorate.61 
According to Munro, the existing channels of legislation do not 
represent the “majority of the electorate;”62 initiative and referendum will 
be a form of direct democracy, allowing the people to bypass legislators and 
special interests.63  Similarly, Teddy Roosevelt contended in the same 
volume that initiative and referendum are “devices for giving better and 
more immediate effect to the popular will.”64  Additionally, then governor 
and soon to be President Woodrow Wilson also wrote in that volume that 
Progressive politics was rooted in the need to address the concentrations of 
wealth damaging American political institutions,65 and that initiative and 
referendum were tools to restore representative government for the 
people.66  Moreover, Progressives saw in direct democracy tools to educate 
voters.67 
 
58. WIEBE, supra note 54, at 181. 
59. HOFSTADTER, supra note 53, at 257-59. 
60. Id. at 261. 
61. WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 16-17 (1913). 
62. Id. at 20. 
63. Id. 
64. Roosevelt, Nationalism and Popular Will, in MUNRO, supra note 61, at 52, 64.  
65. Id. at 69, 85. 
66. Id. at 87. 
67. MUNRO, supra note 61, at 21, 24. 
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Thus, the goal of initiative and referendum was to restore American 
representative democracy.  It would do that by placing legislative power in 
the hands of the people, granting to majorities the powers to make the laws 
for themselves as a way of circumventing the corruption alliance of 
concentrated wealth and elected officials.  In juxtaposition to Madisonian 
democracy, which sought to limit the threat of majority faction by creating 
a complex political machinery with representative government, 
Progressives placed faith in direct democracy as a way to bypass the evils 
of representative government and restore power to the majority. 
A. THE PROGRESSIVE SOLUTION: THE THREAT TO MINORITY RIGHTS 
In some cases, initiative and referendum might be legitimate 
expressions of majority rule.  In many cases, it is not.  Depending on one’s 
political views, direct democracy has produced many important recent 
reforms including medical marijuana and the decriminalization of that 
drug,68 physician-assisted suicide,69 and important or political reform 
initiatives.70  Progressive Era politics may be noble in its goals to break the 
entrenched corruption and state politics at the close of the nineteenth and 
rise of the twentieth century by seeking a direct majority appeal to the 
people.  Yet, Progressives forgot or ignored the essential insights of the 
constitutional framers who saw in majoritarianism a threat to minority and 
individual rights. 
1. Minority Rights Generally Lose 
Generally, minority rights lose in ballot initiatives.  This is the case in 
North Dakota with several recent or proposed amendments having targeted 
reproductive rights, voting rights, or gay-lesbian rights.  Ballot initiatives 
still target minority rights, despite the fact that in the 2012 elections, same-
sex marriage was voted into law in Maine, Maryland, and Washington.  
Moreover, an effort in Minnesota to constitutionally prohibit same-sex 
marriage was also rejected by the voters in the same year.  These four 
victories for supporters of gay rights come after thirty-one states had 
 
68. California Proposition 215 in 1996 added § 11362.5 to the Cal. Health & Safety Code 
legalizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. 
69. Measure 16 of 1994 established Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
127.800-.995 (1995). 
70. For example, in 1974 California voters enacted Proposition 9, enacting the Political 
Reform Act and creating the Fair Political Practices Commission. 
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already limited, via ballot initiatives, the rights of same-sex couples to 
marry.71 
Derrick Bell argues that while ballot initiatives for whites may be an 
expression of democracy at its finest, for the poor and people of color 
referenda can be perceived as a threat to their rights.72  Use of initiative and 
referenda, while often seemingly neutral on their face, discriminate against 
specific groups.70  Bell contends that while the judiciary will police direct 
democracy when the balance between majority rule and minority rights has 
been tipped too much against the latter, he asserts that the judiciary has 
generally not taken an aggressive enough action to look beyond apparent 
neutral processes to guard against abuses.73  Bell’s conclusion is that the 
initiative and referendum process is structurally biased against minority 
rights, and therefore, should be eliminated in light of the warnings of 
majoritarian tyranny that James Madison cautioned.74 
Thomas Cronin notes in Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall that minority rights are often targets of initiatives 
and referenda.75  While it is no doubt the case that some ballot measures 
have supported minority rights, the truth is that more often than not ballot 
measures have become another measure for special interest groups to push 
their agenda—often at the expense of individual rights.  For Cronin, it is 
unlikely that debates on the rights of unpopular or minority groups, or other 
politically salient issues, can be adequately undertaken in a media campaign 
where dollars buy sound bites.76  Deliberation of public policy, however, 
requires more than that. 
Numerous studies examining ballot initiatives have documented their 
hostility to minority rights.77  David B. Magleby reviewed ballot measures 
between 1898 and 1978 and found that only 33% of them were supported 
 
71. Nicole Neroulias, Gay Marriage Foes to Fight Expected Washington State Law, 
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2012, 11:07 PM), available at http://www reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-
gay-marriage-washington-idUSTRE81204O20120203. 
72. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial 
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978-1979). 
73. Id. at 7-9 (criticizing the approach the Court took in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), where it respectively 
upheld laws requiring public approach for zoning changes to build a high rise apartment building 
and before a state public body could create a federally financed public housing project). 
74. Id. at 28-29. 
75. THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL 90-99 (1999). 
76. Id. at 116-23. 
77. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and 
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (1995).  See also DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYRANNY OF THE 
MAJORITY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2012). 
           
2013] STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN NORTH DAKOTA 383 
by the voters.78  Magleby does not, however, indicate what percentage of 
ballot measures targeting minority rights are successful.  Instead, one of the 
most comprehensive studies regarding the hostility of direct democracy to 
minority rights was undertaken by Barbara Gamble.79  Gamble examined 
local and state ballot measures related to AIDS testing, gay rights, 
language, school desegregation, and housing/public accommodations 
desegregation from 1960 to 1993.  She found that 78% of the seventy-four 
civil rights measures in her study defeated minority interests.80 
Additionally, Sylvia Vargas updated and corroborated the Gamble 
study, examining ballot initiatives from 1960 to 1998.81  According to 
Vargas, “In the eighty-two initiatives and referendums surveyed in this 
Article, majorities voted to repeal, limit, or prevent any minority gains in 
their civil rights over 80% of the time.”82  Conversely, in efforts to extend 
civil rights protections, the success rate was barely one in six.83 
Gays, lesbians, and other minority groups generally lose in ballot 
initiatives.84  For example, in 1977, St Paul, Minnesota adopted anti-gay 
discrimination legislation, only to see voters repeal it in a 1978 ballot 
initiative.85  In addition to the thirty-one state initiatives since 2004 that 
have successfully targeted gay rights, Donald P. Haider-Markel and 
Kenneth J. Meier looked at the passage rights of ballot initiatives seeking to 
limit or extend rights to gays and lesbians.86  They found that 77% of the 
time efforts to repeal the rights of gays and lesbians were successful 
whereas only 16% of the efforts to extend rights were adopted.87  This anti-
gay hostility did not stop after 1996 when the Supreme Court ruled in 
Romer v. Evans that a Colorado ballot initiative rescinding local gay rights 
laws was unconstitutional because the law singled out a specific group and 
 
78. Magleby, supra note 77, at 26-27. 




82. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referenda in Which 
Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 425 (1999). 
83. Id. 
84. See generally AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX (2012) (arguing that in 
general anti-gay interests have been successful in using initiative and referendum to the detriment 
of gay rights);  CRONIN, supra note 75, at 94-95. 
85. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 95. 
86. Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral 
Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights (unpublished 
manuscript) (presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association). 
87. Id. at 682-85. 
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imposed upon them a “broad and undifferentiated disability on a single 
named group.”88 
Overall, minority rights are held hostage to ballot initiatives, and they 
should not be.  In Reitman v. Mulkey,82 the Supreme Court invalidated a 
California ballot initiative that sought to repeal recently adopted legislation 
aimed at addressing racial discrimination in the real estate market.  The 
Court ruled that the ballot measure had an “ultimate effect” in furthering 
state discrimination, thereby violating the Equal Protection clause.89  Ballot 
initiatives may be letting the people decide, but the people have no right to 
commandeer the government to discriminate. 
2. Money Spent for Initiatives and Referenda Cannot be Limited 
In its 1978 decision First National Bank v. Bellotti,90 the United State 
Supreme Court declared that money on ballot initiatives was core political 
speech.  Bellotti, along with other decisions such as Federal Elections 
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens Concerned for Life,91 Federal 
Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee,92 California 
Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,93 and Federal 
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee,94 collectively stand for the proposition that limits on the amount 
of money spent or contributed to support ballot initiatives were 
unconstitutional.  More importantly, the Court stated in Bellotti that limits 
on corporate spending for issue advocacy violated the First Amendment.95 
The importance of Bellotti for ballot initiatives is that when the people 
get to vote, the state cannot limit the amount of money spent by any party, 
including corporations.  Hence, use of initiative and referendum opens an 
enormous hole in our existing campaign finance laws, permitting 
corporations and any other parties to spend unlimited amounts of money to 
influence the outcome.  The result is less a ballot proposition being a 
statement about populism and direct democracy and more one potentially 
 
88. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  See also William E. Adams, Jr., Can We Relax Now? An 
Essay About Ballot Measures & Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights After Romer v. Evans, 2 
NAT’L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 188, 190 (1996). 
82 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
89. Id. at 373. 
90. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
91. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
92. 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
93. 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
94. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
95. 435 U.S. at 784. 
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about the ability to use  resources and interests to push a favored corporate 
agenda. 
3. Money Spent On Initiatives and Referenda Circumvent 
Populism 
Thomas Cronin indicates in his book, Direct Democracy, that money 
has a decisive influence on the outcome of ballot measures.  For example, 
he notes that corporate-backed sponsors win 80% of the ballot initiatives 
and that when big money opposes a poorly funded ballot measure, “the 
evidence suggests that the wealthier side has about a seventy-five percent or 
better chance of defeating it.”96  In addition, evidence demonstrates strong 
correlations between the amount of money spent and the number of votes 
cast, and that while money cannot guarantee victory, the amount of money 
spent is decisive in defeating a ballot proposition.97 
Overall, the evidence suggests that a popular ballot measure is more 
often than not defeated by corporate and special interest money.  University 
of Michigan Public Policy Professor Elisabeth R. Gerber reaches a similar 
conclusion that the role of money is that of defeating, but not passing, ballot 
measures.98  Thus, she sees ballot initiatives both as targeting minority 
rights99 while at the same time undermining majoritarian preferences 
because of the ability of wealthy individuals to use money to thwart popular 
preferences. 
4. Big Money Distorts Deliberation 
What big money buys in debates on ballot measures is media exposure.  
According to several studies, media exposure is the single most important 
factor influencing and swaying voter decisions.100  Given the cost of the 
media, for the most part, the public will be asked to make critical public 
policy decisions based upon fifteen second sound bites financed by interests 
that have the most money to spend on the media.  Clearly our constitutional 
framers, and the original supporters of initiative and referendum, did not 
envision policy making premised upon sound bites and the cash nexus, yet 
the evidence, as Cronin and Gerber indicate, suggests that this is exactly 
what has happened in various states.  Moreover, consider the structural 
differences between legislative deliberations and ballot initiatives.  
 
96. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 109. 
97. Id. at 110-13. 
98. Id. at 142-43. 
99. Id.  
100. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 116-23. 
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Legislators are able to compromise, bargain, negotiate, and can find ways to 
take potentially incompatible propositions in legislation and make them 
work together.  Voters are given ballot initiatives as all-or-nothing 
propositions, and cannot vote for part of it.101  Ballot propositions generally 
must adhere to a single subject,102 yielding problems of compromise.  
Additionally, voters may be asked to vote on contradictory propositions103 
again without the ability of legislators to forge compromises or affect 
tradeoffs to render them compatible.  Thus, the deliberative nature of 
representation that Madison and the constitutional framers desired may 
often be missing in ballot initiatives.  The result is the creation of faulty 
legislation that too may fail to adequately capture public sentiment on any 
of the propositions they are asked to render decisions upon. 
5. Initiative and Referendum Has Little Impact On Breaking Up 
Special Interests 
Advocates of initiative and referendum claimed that letting the voters 
decide would help break the hold that special interests had upon 
legislatures.  It would do that in part by mobilizing citizens to outvote 
citizens.  Only part of this Progressive hope has been realized.  While some 
contend that ballot initiatives do not increase voter turnout,104 more recent 
evidence contradicts that and finds that their placement does, in fact, 
mobilize more to participate.105  However, research also indicates that 
interest groups have become effective in using direct democracy to further 
their causes, thus questioning a central tenet of initiative and referendum 
advocates—that their use breaks entrenched interests.106 
 
101. See Chris Chambers Goodman, (M)ad Men:  Using Persuasion Factors in Media 
Advertisements to Prevent a “Tyranny of the Majority” on Ballot Propositions, 32 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 249 (2010). 
102. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983);  Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject 
Rule, 1 ELECTION. L. J, 35 (2002);  John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive 
Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L. J., 399 (2010) (discussing the single-
subject rule). 
103. Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot 
Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD., 383, 394 (2009). 
104. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 226-27. 
105. Daniel A. Smith & Caroline Tolbert, The Instrumental and Educative Effects of Ballot 
Measures: Research on Direct Democracy in the American States, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 416, 
430-31 (2007). 
106. Id. at 432. 
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6. Courts Do Not Always Defer to Ballot Measures 
Another way in which the spirit of populism is frustrated by initiative 
and referendum is in the lack of deference the courts often have towards 
ballot measures.107  In general, courts will defer to the will of legislatures so 
long as there is a rational basis to the policy adopted and there is some 
legislative finding of fact to support the policy.  However, in the case of 
ballot measures, there is often very little, if any, finding of fact or 
legislative hearings to support the initiative or referendum.108  Therefore, the 
courts are unwilling to afford the same deference to initiative and 
referendum as they would to acts of a state legislature.109  Thus, any 
expression of populism that appears to occur as a result of ballot measures 
disappears once they face judicial review and challenges. 
7. Summary 
Overall, there is good evidence that ballot initiatives, such as those 
found in North Dakota, can often target or threaten individual and minority 
rights.  They may undermine the basic protection of rights that the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights are supposed to afford.Moreover, their 
use provides for unrestricted use of money to affect political influence.  
Thus, one can make the argument that the use of initiative and referendum 
highlights—or shares—many of the problems found with it use across the 
country. 
IV. MONEY AND POLITICS 
What role should private money have in the financing of elections in 
the United States?  No one is going to deny that elections are expensive.  
Media time is costly as are “get out the vote” campaigns, voter 
registrations, and a host of other activities that demand significant 
resources.110  Some will argue that we expend too little on elections already, 
 
107. See Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy:  Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 1191, 1234-35 (2005) (noting the decreased deference state courts were giving in Oregon to 
ballot measures);  see also Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from 
Single Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 338-40 (2011). 
108. See generally Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus:  Judicial 
Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 249-50 (1999) (discussing the problems 
regarding standards of review the courts should take toward ballot initiatives). 
109. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 219-20.  See also MATHEW MANWELLER, THE PEOPLE VS. 
THE COURTS:  JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 8, 
218 (2005) (finding that the courts treat ballot initiatives differently from ordinary legislation and 
that they are less likely to defer to and uphold the former compared to the latter);  KENNETH 
MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 89-90, 91-94, 122, 219 (2009). 
110. In 2012, the average cost of winning a U.S. Senate race was approximately $10,351,556 
and $1,596,953 in the U.S. House of Representatives.  Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS 
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especially when compared to how much as a society we spend on our pets 
for example.111  Others might assert that money needs to be raised and 
spent, especially by challengers, to offset incumbent advantages.112  These 
and other points are well taken, but they fundamentally miss the mark. 
The question is not necessarily how much we spend on elections, but 
instead on whether the current system of financing elections is incompatible 
with the values of American democracy.  Should money influence political 
choices and outcomes?  Can we reconcile American democracy with free 
market capitalism in a way that allows the conversion of economic 
resources into political influence?  This is really the basic cluster of 
questions that neither Congress, state legislatures, nor the Supreme Court 
have addressed.  Nor is this a question that most election law scholars seem 
to be asking.  They have failed to get to the deeper question of looking at 
whether the theories or democratic values that give meaning to the 
Constitution, and which should give definition to election law, are 
supported or undermined by the economic values that seem to be at the 
basis of how the United States currently finances its political process. 
Asking this question is no different than raising other, more 
fundamental, questions about values and institutions in American society.  
For example, some would assert that the way health care is allocated in the 
United States is fundamentally at odds with the way it should be allocated.  
By that, health care should be allocated on the basis of medical need or 
illness, not the ability to pay.113  Yet, the United States is a pay-for-access 
and a profit-based system denying millions access to health care.  It is a 
system more costly, with lower access, and less equitable outcomes overall 
than many other health care delivery systems found elsewhere in the 
world.114  Even with reforms found in the Affordable Care Act, many of 
these problems may not be solved because the market system for delivering 
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health care in the United States is incompatible with the basic values of 
what a health care system is supposed to secure—affordable, quality health 
care available for all who need it.  The debate that does not take place in the 
United States is whether the market is the correct or appropriate institution 
to allocate health care.  This is the question that needs to be asked about 
political influence in the United States. 
Is the economic market the correct way to allocate political power or 
influence in the United States?  Should dollars equate to political influence?  
And if so, how does such a conversion affect American democratic values?  
There are really two basic answers to this question.  The first assents to the 
legitimacy of money’s role in allocating political influence in American 
politics.  For the most part, this perspective would urge some form of 
deregulation of money, arguing for a dismantling of all contribution limits 
to go along with the current lack of expenditure limits.  That position, at 
least until recently, has been one of asserting no limits and full disclosure. 
It is similar to the legal environment that currently exists in North 
Dakota.  Yet as we shall see, that position, once held by former FEC 
commissioner Brad Smith and others, has now evolved and he, along with 
James Bopp, and Justice Clarence Thomas, now even contest the legitimacy 
of disclosure rules.  These individuals seem ready to embrace the idea that 
money is constitutionally protected speech.  They seem to believe that there 
is no problem in letting economic wealth and resources be converted over 
into a factor allowing political power or influence in American politics.  
They believe that such a use of money need not be disclosed and can be 
done in a clandestine fashion.  This is a position closer to where North 
Dakota is today—unregulated money but limited disclosure.  Yet a 
competing perspective, partially held by former Justice Stevens, argues that 
money is property, not speech, and as a result, contribution and expenditure 
limits are constitutional.115  While Stevens may not have gone so far as to 
assert that money should not be converted into political influence, there is a 
broader argument that can build upon the “money is not speech” argument 
to assert that American democratic theory needs to significantly confine the 
ability to convert economic resources into political influence. 
A. DEREGULATE BUT DISCLOSE 
For the most part, Buckley established disclosure as part of what Bruce 
Ackerman and Ian Ayres call the old paradigm for campaign finance 
reform.116  They argue that the prevailing paradigm supporting disclosure 
 
115. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
116. BRUCE ACKERMAN AND IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS 3 (2002). 
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saw money in the political process as similar to pollution—it is best to limit 
both and also restrict where either of them can be dumped.117  However, 
they argue that the full disclosure or publicity route has proved to be 
unsuccessful or otherwise plagued by constitutional infirmities,118  thereby 
leading Ackerman and Ayres to reject disclosure and opt instead for what 
they describe as a new paradigm for campaign finance reform that relies 
upon market analogies.119  They called their proposal the “secret donation 
booth.”120  Under this regime, contributions to candidates would be 
anonymous,121 thereby eliminating the incentives to engage in quid pro quo 
activity.  While Ackerman and Ayres appear to be unique in rejecting 
disclosure for anonymity, they are correct in their assertion that the 
prevailing Buckley paradigm does support it.122 
But, why “disclosure-only?”  By disclosure-only, it is meant to allow 
donors to contribute any amount they want to whomever they want, subject 
only to the disclosure of the donation.  The case for disclosure only can be 
articulated on at least two grounds.  First, such a regime is the best or most 
acceptable way to regulate the role of money.  Second, it is advocated in 
lieu of other campaign finance mechanisms because other more extensive 
regimes are unconstitutional or because disclosure is offered as a Trojan 
horse in lieu of real regulation. 
Generally, disclosure-only is advocated by its proponents because they 
do not believe that other forms of regulation are constitutional.  For 
example, Martin Redish believes that money given in a political context is 
protected speech and that the use of money for this purpose is a speech-act 
deserving of constitutional protection.123  While Redish’s Money Talks is 
silent on the issue of disclosure, presumably he would advocate it in some 
circumstances, yet his solution to the corruption and unequal flow of money 
in the political system would be to address the root problem of economic 
inequalities that exist.  Redistributive policies that alter economic power in 
society are thus a preferred solution.124 
Bradley Smith seemed at one time to be the most forceful advocate of 
the disclosure-only regime.  Smith’s support for the disclosure-only 
position was grounded by three definitive reasons.  First, money used for 
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political purposes is protected speech.125  Second, most campaign finance 
reform regulations are difficult to administer.126  Third, disclosure works.127 
For Smith, he appears to accept the Buckley argument that the only 
acceptable justification for the regulation of money in politics is to address 
the problem of corruption or its appearance.128  Yet, unlike the Court which 
endorsed contribution limits in Buckley, Smith sides with Chief Justice 
Burger’s concurrence129 in that the least restrictive means to addressing 
quid pro quo corruption is disclosure.130  Disclosure would thereby render 
any other form of regulation unconstitutional because it is not narrowly-
tailored to secure this compelling interest.131  Moreover, Smith insists that 
disclosure does work.  For example, Smith cites the 1971 Federal Election 
Campaign Act laws as an example of how disclosure brought to light the 
Watergate abuses and the eventual resignation of Richard Nixon as 
evidence that disclosure can root out corruption.132  Elsewhere, he argues 
that disclosure can bring corruption and conflicts of interest to light.133  
Overall, a disclosure-only regime seems capable of serving the compelling 
government interests that the Buckley Court identified. 
However, Smith’s endorsement of disclosure-only seems half-hearted 
at best.  For example, he appears to view it as a form of regulation that 
could be too cumbersome and interfere with First Amendment rights.134  
Second, he cites McIntyre v. Ohio135 to argue that there are limits on what 
can be disclosed, suggesting that this case places some outer limits on 
publicity in the name of protecting privacy.136  Third, he even suggests that 
there may not be strong enough of a governmental justification to compel 
disclosure and that it may in fact burden grassroots political activity.137  
 
125. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
193  (2001). 
126. Id. at 91. 
127. Id. at 32. 
128. Id. at 203-04. 
129. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235-56 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
130. SMITH, supra note 125, at 130. 
131. Id. at 135. 
132. Id. at 32. 
133. Id. at 175. 
134. Id. at 91. 
 135. 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
136. SMITH, supra note 125, at 222.  See also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case 
for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Advocacy, 3 ELEC. L. J. 251 
(2004), for a discussion of the status of McIntyre v. Ohio in the face of the recent McConnell v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n ruling upholding, with limited comment, various disclosure provisions in 
BCRA. 
137. SMITH, supra note 125, at 224-25. 
           
392 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:371 
Fourth, Smith contends that bribery laws are already in place to address 
corruption, thereby questioning the need for disclosure.  Finally, Smith even 
concedes that disclosure might not be able to address certain problems such 
as issue advocacy.138  Overall, by the time one finishes reading Unfree 
Speech, it is unclear whether Smith really supports disclosure as the ideal 
form of regulation—whether he supports it because it works, whether he 
thinks it is actually unconstitutional, or that he thinks it is the only form of 
regulation that passes constitutional muster.  Instead, disclosure appears to 
be a bone thrown to advocates for more forceful reform, hoping that 
endorsing it will be sufficient to deflect demands for other changes. 
In addition to Smith, Kathleen Sullivan,139 Larry Sabato and Glenn 
Simpson,140 and Todd Lochner and Bruce Cain141 also endorse disclosure-
only as their preferred campaign finance reform solutions.  For example, 
Sabato and Simpson document the history of campaign finance reforms in 
the United States, indicating that disclosure has been a preferred solution 
dating back to 1907142 and that it was the central principle of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act and the post-Watergate reforms.143  After an 
exhaustive analysis of then recent money abuses in American politics, 
Sabato and Simpson conclude that new reforms are needed.  The regime 
they call for is described by them as “deregulation plus.”144  Deregulation 
plus is essentially a disclosure-only regime where all contribution limits 
would be abolished,145 and where the fear of public backlash following 
disclosure would serve as a deterrent to groups that do not disclose.146 
In support of their deregulation plus regime, Sabato and Simpson draw 
an analogy between spending on campaigns and elections to that of trading 
in stocks on Wall Street: 
Consider the American stock markets.  Most government oversight 
of them simply makes sure that publicly traded companies 
accurately disclose vital information about their finances.  The 
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philosophy here is that buyers, given, the information they need, 
are intelligent enough to look out for themselves.  There will be 
winners and losers, of course . . . but it is not the government’s 
role to guarantee anyone’s success . . . The notion that people are 
smart enough, and indeed have the duty, to think and choose for 
themselves, also underlies our basic democratic government.  
There is no reason why the same principle cannot be successfully 
applied to a free market for campaign finance.  In this scenario, 
disclosure laws would be broadened and strengthened, and 
penalties for failure to disclose would be ratcheted up, while rules 
on other aspects—such as sources of funds and sizes of 
contributions—could be greatly loosened or even abandoned 
altogether.147 
For Sabato and Simpson, a broadened disclosure regime is preferred 
for several reasons.  First, restrictions on spending implicate First 
Amendment values.148  Second, public financing will not be able to address 
the problems associated with spending by third party groups.149  Third, all 
the current loopholes in the system have effectively created a system 
without any spending or contribution limits.150  Fourth, broadened 
disclosure would bring to light the activities of many groups presently 
hidden.151  Fifth, as noted above, well-informed citizens can make their own 
judgments regarding what they think the contributions and spending 
patterns mean to them and therefore judge accordingly.152 
Sabato and Simpson acknowledge two possible objections to their 
deregulation plus regime.  First, what if groups opt not to disclose?  This is 
where the fear of backlash comes in.  That is, the remedy for groups seeking 
to remain clandestine is that there would be a public backlash against them 
or the candidates they support if they are caught.153  Second, Sabato and 
Simpson worry that a broadened disclosure regime would bring too many 
“politically active but politically inconsequential players into the federal 
regulatory framework.”154  Their solution is to set a high disclosure 
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151. Id. at 330. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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election cycle.155  Below this threshold, there would not be a requirement to 
disclose. 
Kathleen Sullivan has also pressed the case for a disclosure-only 
regime in a pair of articles.  Sullivan contends that there are three types of 
campaign finance reforms currently being advocated: (1) new limits on 
political contributions, (2) public financing, and (3) restrictions on 
expenditures.156  In part, her argument is that all three of these proposals 
would run into a variety of constitution problems, but more importantly, 
Sullivan attacks what she calls the political theory of campaign finance 
reform by examining the “supposed seven deadly sins of political 
money.”157  Sullivan argues that efforts to regulate these seven sins: 
political inequality in voting, distortion, political inequality in 
representation, carpet-bagging, diversion of legislative and executive 
energies, quality of debate, and lack of debate,158 generally face 
constitutional problems or that the sins alleged are “empirical problems” 
that have not yet been adequately demonstrated or clarified to support the 
restrictions imposed.159 
In lieu of the three reform strategies noted above, Sullivan endorses 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Buckley160 and Justice Thomas’s views161 
in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election 
Commission162 that contributions and expenditures should be treated the 
same and left unregulated.163  In its place, she asserts that political money 
will not proliferate indefinitely, so long as “the identity of contributors is 
 
155. Id. 
156. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 667. 
157. Id. at 671. 
158. One can, however, also argue that Sullivan’s choice of the sins to be remedied by 
campaign finance reform miss the real targets of reform.  By that, ensuring that races are more 
competitive, or that the challengers have adequate resources to mount effective races against 
incumbents, are perhaps more crucial issues and concerns than the seven sins that Sullivan directs 
her arguments against. 
159. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 687. 
160. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235-56 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
161. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 666;  see also Sullivan’s Against Campaign Finance 
Reform, infra note 166, at 313. 
162. 518 U.S. 604, 638 (1996)  
Whether an individual donates money to a candidate or group who will use it to 
promote the candidate or whether the individual spends the money to promote the 
candidate himself, the individual seeks to engage in political expression and to 
associate with likeminded persons. A contribution is simply an indirect expenditure. 
Id. 
163. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 
313 (1998) [hereinafter Sullivan’s Against Campaign Finance Reform]. 
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required to be vigorously and frequently disclosed.”164  Instead, 
deregulating contributions accompanied by increased disclosure will have 
three salutatory effects.  First, with more money in the system, the value of 
any one contribution would decrease because politicians would have more 
potential donors to seek out and therefore feel less indebted to any one 
contributor.  To paraphrase Sullivan’s language, with more quids in the 
system, politicians have “less reason to commit to any particular quo.”165  
Second, deregulating contributions would decrease the value of subterfuge 
whereby groups presently resort to independent expenditures and soft 
money contributions to parties.166  Finally, disclosure would subject 
candidates to voter retaliation if exposed as taking too large of contributions 
from some individuals or groups.167  Proof, for Sullivan, that voter 
retaliation works can be found in the 1996 presidential race where 
disclosure of Democratic fund-raising scandals had a temporary impact on 
President Clinton’s poll numbers.168  Overall, Sullivan describes an 
enforced disclosure regime as the preferred alternative to either a purely 
laissez-faire or more extensively regulated system with contribution and 
expenditure limits and public financing. 
Todd Lochner and Bruce Cain also press the case for disclosure-only, 
but do so as a result of their claims that other systems of campaign finance 
regulation—such as contribution limits—faces numerous enforcement 
problems.  They base their claims both upon empirical studies of the 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) and the California Fair Political 
Practices Commission (“FPPC”).169  In examining the enforcement 
practices of both, significant time delays in enforcement question whether 
the use of formal sanctions by either deters illegal campaign practices.170  
Similarly, they also question whether informal sanctions—the fear of public 
exposure—will be a sufficient deterrent.171  This deterrence would work 
only if voters take the time to research violations, and if the press 
sufficiently and adequately covers the violations.172  While there is some 
evidence that press coverage of illegal activity does have an impact upon 
 
164. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 688. 




169. Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 630;  Lochner & Cain 1999, supra note 141, 
at 1892. 
170. Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 649. 
171. Id. at 653-54. 
172. Id. 
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candidates, these studies overwhelmingly conclude that the deterrent value 
is weak.173 
Instead of contribution or other limits, Lochner and Cain argue that a 
disclosure-only regime might be easier to enforce.  These types of regimes 
do not confront many of the difficult legal questions that other regulations 
face.174  Thus, for Lochner and Cain, disclosure-only is opted for, even 
though the authors do not endorse it as necessarily the best system for 
regulating money in the political process.175  Like Sabato and Simpson, they 
draw upon the market analogy and view politics as a free market.176  
According to Lochner and Cain: 
If politics is indeed a market, then let the market solve the 
problem.  Consider abolishing expenditure and contribution limits 
and instead emphasize transparency based on immediate internet 
disclosure.  If voters actually care about where a candidate’s 
money comes from, or how much money is spent, let them vote 
based upon such distaste.177 
Thus, despite their admonitions that voters do not spend much time 
gathering information on candidates, and despite their criticism of the 
deterrence model, in the end Lochner and Cain resort to both in defense of 
their disclosure-only regime. 
The chorus of support for deregulate-but-disclose does not stop here.  
John Samples argues against campaign finance limits, contending that there 
is little evidence that money corrupts the political process or that it affects 
decisions on who runs or does not run for office.178  James Bopp, a frequent 
litigator and critic of campaign finance reform laws that limit donations, 
argued at one point in favor of donate but disclose179 before taking his 
current position against even disclosure.180 
 
173. Id. at 654. 
174. Id. at 649. 
175. Id. 
 176. Lochner & Cain 1999, supra note 141 at 1935. 
177. Id. 
178. See generally JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2006);  
John Samples, Against Deference, 12 NEXUS 21, 23 (2007). 
179. James Bopp, Jr., & Kaylan Lytle Phillips, The Limits of Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission:  Analytical and Practical Reasons Why the Sky Is Not Falling, 46 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 281 (2012);  James Bopp, Jr., & Joseph E. LaRue, The Game Changer: Citizens United’s 
Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251 (2010-11). 
180. James Bopp Jr. & Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of “Reform and Transparency”:  A Plea 
to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and Disclosure” 
Holding, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010-11). 
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Overall, in defending disclosure-only, several claims from its advocates 
can be gleaned.  First, disclosure-only regimes will more readily discourage 
the proliferation of money than will other regimes.  Second, disclosure-only 
regimes will deter large contributions or contributors because of fear of 
voter backlash.  Third, disclosure-only regimes are better able to address the 
problems associated with spending by third parties than other types of 
regimes.  Fourth, disclosure-only regimes will produce more money in the 
political system, resulting in less quid pro quos.  Fifth, disclosure-only 
regimes will discourage subterfuge.  Sixth, disclosure-only regimes will 
equalize spending and competition.  Seventh, disclosure-only regimes are 
easier to enforce and implement. 
B. DISCLOSURE IS NOT ENOUGH 
There are three major problems with the disclosure-only arguments.  
One is conceptual, the second empirical, and the third is a structural 
democratic one.  Conceptually, the case for disclosure-only lacks 
development or rests upon numerous faulty assumptions. 
First, in arguing for disclosure-only, what is left unclear in many of its 
advocates’ arguments is what it means to have disclosure and what it means 
to say that it works.181  For example, what would have to be disclosed to 
qualify as a disclosure-only regime?  Would it be disclosure of all 
contributions—including expenditures?  With that said, what does it mean 
to “disclose all contributions?”  Is it contributions made down to one cent?  
Is it contributions from individuals, corporations, unions, PACS, conduit 
funds?182  Does it also include contributions to PACS?  If so, what do we 
wish to know?  Is it simply dollar amounts or do we also wish to know 
names, addresses, and employers?  In the case of Sabato and Simpson, at 
least they are clear in terms of exempting some groups and individuals from 
disclosure if they fall below a certain threshold.  However, while such a 
threshold might minimize excessive regulatory entanglement, and perhaps 
comply with the constitutional requirements of NAACP v. Alabama,183 
 
181. See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 
27 J.L. & POL. 683 (2012);  Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 
273, 275 (2010);  Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out:  A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557 (2012), for thoughtful discussions on 
what disclosure actually means in the age of the Internet. 
182. WIS. STAT. § 11.01(5m) (2003) (“‘Conduit’ means an individual who or an organization 
which receives a contribution of money and transfers the contribution to another individual or 
organization without exercising discretion as to the amount which is transferred and the individual 
to whom or organization to which the transfer is made.”).  WISC. STAT. § 11.06(11) mandates the 
public disclosure and reporting of conduit funds. 
183. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that a state law requiring a private association to publicize 
the names of its members violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association). 
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Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton,184 
and McIntyre v. Ohio, Sabato and Simpson ignore an unintended effect of 
their threshold—the fact that many small groups have huge impacts in local 
federal races and there would be an incentive to proliferate lots of small 
groups to avoid disclosure.  Why would groups still wish to avoid 
disclosure?  If the identity of groups or contributors is a signal regarding 
where a candidate stands on issues, such as in the case of candidates who 
receive money from the National Rifle Association or from Emily’s List, 
then many candidates or groups might wish to obscure the source of their 
money.185 
Moreover, Sabato and Simpson and Sullivan rely upon disclosure as a 
deterrent effect, although the nature of the deterrence for them is very 
different.  For Sabato and Simpson, deterrence comes into play as a way to 
encourage groups and individuals to disclose for fear of public backlash if 
they do not, but are nonetheless caught.186  For Sullivan, deterrence comes 
into play as a way to discourage candidates from taking too large of 
contributions from big donors, less voter backlash.187  Now assuming in the 
first case that groups can be detected if they try to hide from disclosing, 
there are several problems with the voter backlash thesis.  First, while both 
Sabato/Simpson and Sullivan contend that deregulating contributions will 
remove the disincentive for groups to give independently or seek 
subterfuge, they—and especially Sullivan—also stipulate that fear of voter 
backlash will discourage contributions.  Does not this fear of backlash 
create an incentive for subterfuge? 
Yet, even if fear of backlash does not discourage clandestine activity, 
there are real questions regarding the efficacy of deterrence.  Within the 
field of criminal justice, while deterrence is often articulated as a goal of 
punishment, proof of its efficacy is questionable.188  A deterrence theory in 
criminal justice assumes, among other things: (1) potential offenders who 
 
184. 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
185. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (stating that knowledge of a candidate’s 
contributions “allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than 
is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches” and that the “sources 
of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most 
likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.”). 
186. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 140, at 334. 
187. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 689. 
188. See SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS, 100 (2001);  
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY, 59-60 (2001);  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:  THREE STRIKES AND YOUR-RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA, 94-5, 103-
5 (2001) (indicating that the California three strikes and you’re out policy rested upon the concept 
of deterrence and that the evidence indicates that the three strikes laws did not deter). 
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are aware of the punishment; (2) offenders weigh the punishment against 
the benefit of committing the crime; (3) offenders believe that they will be 
caught, and; (4) that the society-defined punishment is actually perceived as 
punishment to the offenders.189  The same logic applies to the backlash 
thesis advocated by both Sabato/Simpson and Sullivan in that one needs to 
assume that voters are rational, paying attention to campaign contributions, 
weighing contributions when making electoral choices, and that they will 
punish candidates because they are taking contributions from donors whom 
they do not approve.  It is not clear that this model works in the real world. 
Even Kathleen Sullivan seems to acknowledge that the backlash is of 
limited value, noting that revelations of Democratic Party fundraising only 
had a temporary impact on Clinton’s polling numbers and that he did win 
the election.  Clinton and the Democrats did the crime but did not have to 
the do time because the backlash was muted.  So much for deterrence. 
There are other problems in defining what disclosure means among its 
advocates.  In terms of expenditures, does disclosure include real time 
disclosure, or does it include a statement indicating the source of the 
contributions?  Moreover, if one is to have disclosure-only, how should it 
occur?  Should it be online or in paper form?  Should it be updated daily, 
weekly, or monthly?  All of these are issues left unresolved or explained in 
terms of constructing a disclosure-only policy. 
Dennis Thompson also points out that a disclosure-only regime would 
never be satisfactory because it would fail to reveal the tacit promises, 
agreements, or understandings embedded in the very essence of political 
contributions.190  Disclosure-only, more importantly, would fail to address 
many of the critical problems that money creates in campaign and elections, 
such as allowing for the personal conversion of wealth into political 
influence.  It would be, in many ways, a post-facto remedy at best.  As 
Bradley Smith’s Watergate example demonstrates, disclosure did not 
prevent the Nixon fundraising abuses; it only caught them several years 
later after the election had occurred.191  Disclosure-only is not prophylactic; 
it is a post-abuse remedy, which often does little to punish the wrongdoer. 
Disclosure-only also presupposes that citizens are informed, aware, and 
capable of digesting and understanding campaign finance reform 
information.  This is certainly true in the Sabato and Simpson model where 
they draw parallels between political campaigns and Wall Street, or 
Lochner and Cain in describing elections to be like a marketplace.  None of 
 
189. WALKER, supra note 188, at 100. 
190. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS:  CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 110 (2002). 
191. See generally SMITH, supra note 125. 
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these assumptions are likely to take place on a sufficient scale.  Specifically, 
the disclosure-only policy seems to assume rational, informed voters who 
will seek out campaign finance information, weigh it in comparison to other 
knowledge they have about candidates, and then express an informed 
preference based upon all this.  However, even Lochner and Cain 
acknowledge this depiction of voters is unrealistic,192 and such a model of 
behavior is unlikely to occur except among a few, with many instead 
perhaps voting more out of concern regarding the economy, war and peace, 
or other issues more salient. 
As Elizabeth Garrett points out,193 disclosure has its limits.  Voters 
have limited time, knowledge, and expertise.194  They face many complex 
choices.  They do not act as the fully informed market participants that 
Smith, Sullivan, and Sabato and Simpson envision.  Instead, voters use a 
variety of cues when making voting choices, such as who gives the 
candidate money or the party of the candidate, and they also need 
information packaged in a way that is digestible and useable to them if 
disclosure-only is to work.195  Yet, none of the advocates of the disclosure-
only regime have paid any attention to these issues.  None of this is to say 
to the source of political money is unimportant to voters.  Instead, how 
campaigns are financed is a process issue different from the content of 
issues that people consider when making voting choices.  Conflating the 
two is a mistake, demonstrating a misunderstanding regarding between how 
elections are run and the factors that influence electoral choice. 
Sabato and Simpson’s analogy of comparing elections and voters to the 
stock market and investors is inapt on several grounds.196  First, presumably 
investors are more informed about financial matters than would be general 
voters simply by the fact that investors might tend to be better educated 
than many voters.  Second, however, the recent Wall Street scandals 
involving Enron, WorldCom, and a host of other companies demonstrate 
that even investors are not well informed.  There are many abuses in the 
financial markets, some of which could be attributed to a lack of disclosure 
(but also many of them sourced in illegal behavior that included lying and 
possible abuse of market positions).  If Sabato and Simpson’s call to make 
 
192. Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 648. 
193. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV 1011 (2003). 
194. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 271 (1996) (noting the lack of knowledge Americans have about 
politics and specifically discussing how this lack of knowledge and expertise affects political 
engagement and motivation). 
195. Id. at 44-5 (discussing the use of cues among voters as surrogates for more substantive 
political knowledge). 
196. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 140, at 330. 
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the Federal Election Commission act more like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) in policing disclosure, the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley197 and other Wall Street reforms demonstrate a demand for 
strengthened regulatory behavior on the part of the SEC beyond simply 
mandating more disclosure. 
Third, Wall Street regulation has never been simply a disclosure-only 
regime.  The existence of antitrust laws and the enforcement activity by the 
Federal Trade Commission, among other agencies, is proof that simple 
disclosure of business practices is not enough to protect either investors or 
consumers.198  Finally, unlike playing the stock market, which produces 
private goods, voting has an external effect such that one person’s choice on 
whom to vote for will have an impact on others in terms of what candidates 
are elected.  Put simply, there are numerous individual and collective 
benefits attached to voting choices and the regulation of campaigns that 
may distinguish the regulation of elections and voters from that of the stock 
market and investors. 
In making the case that disclosure-only is the best possible solution, 
Sabato and Simpson state that it has been used since 1907—and especially 
since Watergate—as a guiding principle to regulate money in politics.  
Instead of viewing history as vindication of disclosure-only, the failure of it 
to clean up campaigns and elections over the last 100 years should be proof 
that more than disclosure-only is needed.  Thus, disclosure-only fails for 
lack of conceptual clarity, exaggerated conceptions of voter rationality, and 
misplaced use of both the marketplace and deterrence analogies.  Moreover, 
as some have argued, from an empirical point of view, disclosure only 
regimes failure to demonstrate any superiority in terms of discouraging the 
proliferation of money, deterring large contributions or contributors because 
of fear of voter backlash, addressing third party money, or discouraging 
subterfuge.  If the goal of donate-but-discourage, or allow for donations but 
still discourage them through disclosure or other mechanisms, is to address 
the goals of preventing corruption or its appearance or producing elections 
 
197. Pub. Co. Accounting Reform and Investor Prot. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 et seq (2002). 
198. Drawing analogies of the political to the economic marketplace seem to be at odds with 
several arguments to segment or bracket the two.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (stating that “[d]irect corporate spending on political activity 
raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an 
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”).  Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting in part) (stating that “I do not dispute that the threat from corporate political activity 
will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation; it is obvious that large 
and successful corporations with resources to fund a political war chest constitute a more potent 
threat to the political process than less successful business corporations or nonprofit 
corporations.”). 
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less dependent upon money, then these types of regimes fail miserably to 
live up to their promise.199 
Yet the deregulate-yet-disclose or disclosure-only position once held 
by many is either no longer their position or their original argument was 
merely a Trojan Horse to contend against contribution limits until such time 
as they could then dismantle them and then go after disclosure.  Bradley 
Smith now contends that many disclosure laws violate a right to privacy 
and hurt public discourse.200  William McGeveran similarly worries about 
disclosure and privacy rights.201  John Samples also opposes disclosure and 
too finds that it hurts deliberation.202  Bopp sees in disclosure the handwork 
of tyranny and tyrants.203  Bopp even argues that disclosure chills speech 
and seems bent on offering evidence of this on the election law listserv and 
elsewhere, although he does seem to support disclosure for candidate 
contributions, for now. 
Because public disclosure of a person’s political activity and/or 
political viewpoints can lead to harassment and that, as a result, 
lack of anonymity chills speech, the government needs a 
compelling justification to require disclosure.  I agree that one of 
those instances where disclosure is justified is contributions to 
candidates.204 
Cleta Mitchell goes so far as to argue that disclosure is incompatible with 
the First Amendment.205  Even Clarence Thomas, in Doe v. Reed seems 
skeptical of disclosure laws because of concerns about harassment,206 and 
privacy.  Jim Bopp states his stance well: “[b]lacks, gays and leftist[s] were 
harassed yesterday; conservatives and Christians are harassed today. And 
no one is safe from the thugs and bullies tomorrow.”207  Bopp, Samples, 
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203. See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of “Reform and 
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MINN. L. REV. 1755 (2012). 
206. 561, U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2844-45 (2010) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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and the others who first argued against contribution limits and now 
disclosure, do so frankly because such policy positions seemingly hurt the 
interests and parties they espouse. 
Of course in some cases, privacy and anonymity may be in order.  In 
the case of NAACP v. Alabama,208 there was clear evidence of harassment 
and intimidation that included “economic reprisal, loss of employment, 
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.209  
This case also took place at a time when the civil rights movement was 
growing, and lynching, cross burnings, and other acts of intimidation were 
taking place across the south.  There were also documented instances of 
persecution cited by the Court in Brown v. Socialist Workers 1974 
Campaign Committee.210  The evidence in both cases was enough for the 
Court to reject attempts to force disclosure of membership and contributor 
lists.  Yet, as Hasen points out, there is scant evidence of donor intimidation 
or harassment, despite the best efforts by some to find it or trump on 
instances.211  Even Kathleen Sullivan, a supporter of disclosure only laws, 
concedes that disclosure of donors does little to impede their activity.  Part 
of the problem is in defining harassment, intimidation, or chilling of speech.  
As Smith and his co-authors ask in their election law book: are instances of 
leaflets being torn, swearing, pushing over a table, and perhaps even some 
pushing and shoving demonstrators or others atypical and evidence of 
intimidation?212  Is being mooned a form of intimidation or chilling?213  It is 
not so clear that these are such instances of that or that this is not what 
should be expected in the world of politics.  Politics is about passion and 
advocacy, and to some extent, people should expect that articulating 
positions will elicit responses.  This, after all, is the purpose of advocating 
positions and communicating in general–getting a response. 
Moreover, there may be legitimate cases where disclosure does 
compromise or hurt deliberations.  Jury deliberations are private.  But, a 
general across the board argument for privacy or non-disclosure of 
donations seems overly broad and contrary to the general democratic values 
of transparency and public decision-making.  In many cases, tyrants seek 
disclosure, but the essence of oppression is secrecy and operating in the 
shadow.  There may be cases where donations up to a certain dollar amount 
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should be shielded from disclosure to protect people from job retaliation.  
However, to argue that corporations, PACs, and large donors should be 
protected from disclosure and prevent them from being chilled in their 
speech is incorrect.  Moreover, to assert that these entities are weak and 
powerless, or discrete and insular and needing protection in the political 
marketplace, is disingenuous at best.  There are two arguments here, both 
directed at addressing the structural democratic argument in favor of 
disclosure and in terms of building up a wall that shields the polity from 
being influenced by money and economic market factors. 
First, Anthony Johnstone makes the case for disclosure in terms of 
Madisonian democracy.214  He places the argument for disclosure in terms 
of the Republican-concern to address corruption, as manifest in James 
Madison’s arguments in Federalist Ten regarding the need to combat and 
check factions.215  This is a conception of corruption that transcends the 
simple notion of quid pro quo that dominates current justifications for 
contribution limits and disclosure.216  The concern with factions is to root 
out groups who wish to oppose the public interest or the rights of others—it 
is an anti-democratic or anti-popular government motive.  To a large extent, 
the difference between a faction and any other group organizing is one of 
purpose and intent—which includes licit and illicit intents.  Disclosure 
furthers what Johnstone calls an anti-factional interest.217  This is an interest 
in ascertaining information about factions so that we know their purposes.  
Exposing their purposes is critical to promoting a democratic government 
because it is part of controlling the effects of factions. 
Disclosure, though, does more.  It may discourage illicit actions.  Is 
there anything unconstitutional in seeking to deter factions or groups from 
engaging in activities that are impermissible?  No.  In general, the law seeks 
to deter individuals and groups from engaging in anti-social and illegal 
behavior.  To say someone is chilled from committing a crime is 
nonsensical.  Similarly, to say that one is chilled from expending large sums 
of money to buy or leverage political influence also is nonsensical and it 
seems to presuppose that it is perfectly legitimate to leverage economic 
resources to achieve this purpose. 
This is the real crux of the issue.  Smith, Samples, and Bopp all seem to 
think it is legitimate to convert economic resources over into political 
resources and therefore want to argue that money is speech, that limits on 
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donations and expenditures are unconstitutional, and that efforts to regulate 
money in politics and to promote disclosure is chilling protected freedoms.  
In essence, the First Amendment enshrines capitalism.  For the most part, 
the Supreme Court seems to be willing to accept this assumption that 
economic resources should convert over into political influence.  This is the 
core problem that the Supreme Court has failed to address. 
C. DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: WHY MONEY NEEDS TO BE 
LIMITED 
The real question in the money and politics or “money is speech” 
controversy is over the legitimate or permissible relationship between 
democracy and capitalism.  Historically many argue that there is an 
interconnection between the rise of capitalism, religion, and democracy.218  
Capitalism and democracy merged roughly at the same time in Europe 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Scholars asserted that the 
concept of economic liberty and being free to act as the pejorative economic 
man in the market place reinforced and gave impetus to the individual 
liberty and the right to make choices in the political marketplace.  Limited 
government protected both economic and political liberty. 
In his classic Capitalism and Freedom,219 Milton Friedman, 
emphasized the connection between democracy and capitalism by 
recognizing not only the historical connections between free markets and 
individual freedom, but the current and critical interrelationship between the 
two systems as well.  When the gates of communism came crashing down 
in the 1990s, many argued that a prerequisite to building democracy in 
these former totalitarian states began with the privatization of state 
enterprises and the establishment of market economies.220  To a large 
extent, the evolutions of western capitalism and democracy have been 
inextricably connected.  To many, it is no coincidence that the American 
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Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations were 
both penned in the same year.  For Milton Friedman, F.A. Hayek,221 and 
others, economic liberty and political liberty are reinforcing, and mutually 
necessary, in creating democracy.  In other cases, the argument is that 
democracy requires a certain level of economic affluence and 
development—even if such affluence and development is not rooted in 
capitalism.222 
There is, however, a contrary perspective that challenges the 
connection between markets, political freedom and democracy.  Capitalism 
and democracy or free markets and limited government are not always 
reinforcing but can be in tension if not in outright conflict.223  Chile, under 
its president General Pinochet, was the epitome of free market capitalism 
and totalitarianism.  Similarly, China has perhaps one of the most 
successful capitalist systems in the world right now under the direction of 
an oppressive state with limited political freedom that gives lip service to 
communism.  In the United States, however, we supposedly have blended 
the right combination of capitalism and democracy. 
Additionally, there are a host of democratic theorists that contend that 
capitalism and democracy are in conflict.  Robert Dahl, for example, 
describes this opposition as one where the political process is not 
autonomous and instead is controlled or limited in its autonomy by 
economic enterprises, market choices, and private investment decisions.224  
C.B. MacPherson asserts that capitalism’s extractive capabilities undermine 
the developmental capacities of some by transferring them from one to 
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another.  In effect, capitalism undermines the ethical capacities of 
individuals necessary to engage in democratic decision making by taking 
away from some the economic means to act as an equal participant in the 
polity.225  Carol Gould pushes this argument further by asserting that 
economic inequalities and hierarchies undermine social cooperation and the 
political balance between freedom and equality.226  Charles Lindblom 
describes the market as a prison and corporate economic power as 
incompatible with democratic self-governance.227  On the other hand, others 
address the failure to address corporate power in America as a threat to 
democracy.228  The fundamental problem here is that market or economic 
logic has penetrated democratic theory and practice.229  The question is: 
how is this so? 
Culture is a totality as the philosopher Georg Hegel once stated.230  
There is the marketplace or the economy, the government, and then civil 
society.  Daniel Bell, a famous sociologist, once wrote in the Cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism that these three components make up a 
culture.231  Bell contended that the three also have their own logic and 
values.  The hallmark of Modernity is their separation.232  The political 
theorist Michael Walzer argued that the emergence of contemporary free 
societies resided in how the unity of totalitarianism is broken up by the 
walls of pluralism.233  We maintain freedom in our society by walling off 
issues—we separate the public from the private and the secular from the 
parochial for example—in order to promote freedom.  We define limits to 
how far the government can go by creating constitutions and a bill of rights.  
We limit the abuses of the marketplace with government regulation, and the 
power of society to intrude upon privacy is maintained by marking 
distinctions between private morality and public neutrality and by declaring 
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that the government should not promulgate personal ethics or religious 
values.  Freedom in modern society is maintained by maintaining walls. 
The danger, though, is when boundaries are crossed, such as when the 
market intrudes upon how we value human life, when government invades 
personal rights, or when private morality dictates how others should live.  A 
society without walls of separation runs the danger of turning oppressive.  
Think about how governments and markets interact in at least four ways.  
First, they represent the two dominate ways to distribute goods and 
services.234  Except in the case of face-to-face barter economies, free market 
and government distribution of goods and services provide rival ways to 
coordinate their production and distribution.235  They do that either by 
decentralizing and privatizing these decisions, in the case of market 
mechanisms, or centralizing them, as with planned economies.  Often these 
decisions are not dichotomized; in most societies, there is a continuum or 
hybrid of market-government and decentralized-centralized mechanisms 
that operate. 
Second, public power is necessary to create free markets.  Polanyi 
argued that free markets are not architectonic.236  They did not just arise and 
develop on their own.237  The establishment of these free markets, 
especially during the nineteenth century in Europe, was the product of 
significant uses of governmental authority and power in order to enforce the 
rules of free markets.  Even Milton Friedman, a conservative free market 
economist from the United States who was best noted for his arguments in 
favor of privatization and minimal governmental intervention into the 
economy, conceded that public authority to enforce the basic rules of the 
market place.238  Max Weber’s writings on bureaucratic behavior are often 
read as lessons for organizational theory.239  It is, however, important to 
remember that Weber discussed bureaucracy and authority within the 
context of capitalism and the role of the former in helping to sustain it.240  
More specifically, Weber insisted that modern bureaucracies and economic 
orders, specifically capitalism, are interconnected.241 
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Third, governmental authority is required to address and regulate 
market failures, such as free rider problems, (negative) externalities, 
information asymmetries, and monopolies.242  For many economists, 
unregulated free markets produce problems that only government regulation 
can correct.  These may be problems surrounding maintenance of 
demand,243 distributional issues, or other pathologies that impede efficiency 
or the ability of markets to react to disequilibrium.244 
Fourth, government intervention may be necessary to provide public 
infrastructure investment or insure profitability of private businesses.245  
While Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations is best remembered as the first 
statement defending free markets and capitalism, the book also offers an 
important defense for government investment in basic infrastructure, like 
roads and canals in Smith’s day and schools and telecommunications today, 
in order to sustain and support private investment.246  Moreover, James 
O’Connor has argued that modern capitalist states serve two basic 
functions—promote legitimization or support for the regime and undertake 
activities that make it possible for private businesses to maintain 
profitability or maintain capital accumulation.247 
The general point here is that markets may be great mechanisms to 
allocate sail boats and luxury items but not political influence and 
democratic values.  Allocation of political power and influence should be 
distributed according to non-market criteria.  As Daniel Bell pointed out, 
market logic and concepts were increasingly coming to encroach or infringe 
upon other parts of American culture including, for our purposes here, the 
polity or political process.248  Others, such as Michael Sandel, have argued 
that the danger now is the fact that the United States is turning from a 
market economy to a market society where increasing all types of social 
intercourse are being reduced to a cash nexus.249  Robert Kuttner makes a 
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similar point.250  To a large extent, American political power is constantly 
subjected to a marketization of its operations. 
The issue here is not one of efficacy or money.  It is not whether 
money makes a difference in terms of who is elected or who has political 
influence.  One could debate forever whether money buys influence, but 
there is significant evidence that economic inequalities have political 
consequences.251  Specifically, political influence is associated with 
affluence and the American policy process seems skewed to favor class 
preferences, especially when one examines the relationship between class 
and political engagement.252  Schattschneider contends that the mobilization 
of bias in the American political process has produced a political system 
favoring the more affluent.253  Stated otherwise, when the policy 
preferences of the more affluent are different from the lower and middle 
classes, the former generally have their preferences reflected in policy 
outcomes.254  The issue instead is one about justice and fairness.  It is about 
whether money is the appropriate criteria to use to determine who has 
political influence or authority.  It is about setting boundaries, as Walzer 
would argue,255 demarcating distinctions between the market economy and 
the political system.  While the field of political economy may be a 
legitimate academic discipline, the American political system is not a 
market democracy—the economic market place and the political forum or 
agora should be distinct.  The allocative criterion for a political democracy 
is not the same as that for market capitalism.  This is what the Bradley 
Smiths, John Samples, and James Bopps fail to appreciate. 
Even though American democracy has grown along with capitalism, 
the two should not be conflated.  For one, classical republican theory which 
tremendously influenced the American political founding and founders is 
characterized by fear of corruption that comes from, in part, a concern about 
unequal distributions of property and wealth.256  Classical republican 
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theorists, such as James Harrington, drew a connection between political 
power and wealth or property, seeking in such divisions threats to a 
republican form of government.257  James Madison too, in Federalist Ten, 
described the “most common and durable source of factions has been the 
various and unequal distribution of property.”258  Harrington, republican 
theorists in general, and James Madison would have endorsed the idea that 
somehow a wall must be fashioned that prevents the effects of wealth, as a 
faction, from adversely affecting the political process.  Thus, for those 
originalists looking to a theory of democracy to support a jurisprudence that 
sustains limits on the use of money for political purposes, there is good 
evidence that a founding set of American values would sustain that 
attempt.259 
Additionally, one can occasionally point to some dicta in Supreme 
Court decisions suggesting a broader understanding regarding a democratic 
theory of election law that would wall off impermissible uses of money in 
the political process.  For example, Justice White, dissenting in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,260 declared that it was reasonable to be 
concerned about the use of concentrated wealth in politics. 
States have provided corporations with such attributes in order to 
increase their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy 
generally.  It has long been recognized however, that the special 
status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast 
amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate 
not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the 
electoral process.  Although Buckley v. Valeo provides support for 
the position that the desire to equalize the financial resources 
available to candidates does not justify the limitation upon the 
expression of support which a restriction upon individual 
contributions entails, the interest of Massachusetts and the many 
other States which have restricted corporate political activity is 
quite different . . . . It is not one of equalizing the resources of 
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opposing candidates or opposing positions, but rather of 
preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth 
as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain 
economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair 
advantage in the political process, especially where, as here, the 
issue involved has no material connection with the business of the 
corporation.261 
In addition to Justice White acknowledging as legitimate the need to 
draw boundaries between the economic and political spheres, Justice 
Rehnquist, in the same case, hits a similar theme in stating that “[i]t might 
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic 
sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.”262  Finally, the 
majority opinion in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work 
Committee,263 perhaps articulated it the best when it quoted the government 
defending a federal campaign finance law that its purpose was “to ensure 
that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages 
which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted 
into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from 
legislators who are aided by the contributions.”264 
What these comments from the Supreme Court suggest is recognition 
that money used for political purposes needs to be limited.  Politics in 
general, and campaigns and elections in particular, may be expensive, but as 
noted earlier, that it a different assertion from the one being made here.  
Money may be necessary to run campaigns and elections, but their costs or 
funding sources should not undermine democratic values.  According to 
Dahl, the problem of Buckley v. Valeo is that the Justices failed to 
understand how a democratic system derives its legitimacy from political 
equality.265  Allowing the allocative criteria of the economy to substitute for 
equality in the political arena gives money and wealth a role that it just 
should not have in American democracy. 
The United States Constitution, as Justice Holmes is repeatedly quoted 
from Lochner v. New York, does not embody a specific economic theory.266  
The same can be said about American democracy.  The democratic theory 
at the foundation of American election law which should guide the 
jurisprudence in this area should treat seriously the notion that a wall of 
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separation needs to be erected between the economy and the polity that is 
no less high than the one between church and state.  Neutrality, at least in 
the political realm, demands distinct values and criteria separating it from 
the economy.  This implies that the use of money to affect political 
decisions is an illicit or illegitimate purpose that ought to be chilled, and 
seeking to prevent that conversion from occurring is a compelling 
governmental interest that should be enough to substantiate the conclusion 
that money is not speech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
North Dakota is an example of two of the major problems in 
contemporary American election law.  The first is that it allows for the use 
of ballot initiatives to make policy, and the second is that it endorses the 
unregulated use of money to influence campaigns and elections,  In terms of 
the problems associated with the former, the result has been to allow for 
initiative and referendum to target personal freedoms.  Majority rule is thus 
being used in ways to undermine minority rights that James Madison and 
perhaps other constitutional framers feared.  In the second case, North 
Dakota allows for the conversion of personal and corporate wealth into 
political influence.  This, perhaps, results in the state receiving an overall 
failing grade when it comes to political corruption, and perhaps its 
domination by powerful special interests. 
The use of initiative and referendum, and the failure to regulate the role 
of money in politics, are not the only problems facing this state.  North 
Dakota’s generally laissez-faire approach to disclosure of any kind, minimal 
regulation of lobbyists, and its endorsement of close working relationships 
between public officials and interest groups belie a state that likes to bask in 
a populist image.  Instead, such a regulatory environment does not yield 
democracy but instead can produce the corruption that defines North 
Dakota’s political environment. 
So what is to be done?  Are there easy or simple fixes for the state, of 
for that matter, for other jurisdictions across the country facing similar 
problems?  One could perhaps suggest political contribution limits to 
candidates and political organizations that come with better and more rapid 
disclosure.  One could also suggest better lobbyist disclosure with limits on 
gifts.  One might also advocate for better conflict of interest laws for public 
officials and even for sharp limits on the use of ballot initiatives when it 
comes to individual rights.  All of these proposals could go a long way 
toward improving the state of democracy in North Dakota, and in the 
United States. 
 
